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Diagnosis in Management. A Comparative Analysis 
of Approaches to Management Integration 
Integrated Management: The State of the Art 
Another Dilemma in Managemeot Innovation 
Innovation in management is very oflco achieved by the addition of new management 
functions to the bulk of existing management jobs. In some cases progress comes from 
putting the focus on specific management functions which have thus far been 
neglected. By this procedure compensation, motivation, goals (results, objectives), 
corporate culture, budgeting, organisational desigo, and strategic thinking have been 
introduced into the managemeot system. This "additive" behavior resulted in lists of 
management jobs becoming much longer than Fayol's system of managerial functions 
or the POSOCORB-scheme from the early days of management research. Current 
debates on, for example. "controlling or culture" as pivotal conditions for management 
success prove that the strategy of management growth by focus relocation is still alive 
and well. 
Unfonunately, as we have learned from Schumpeter's "creative destruction" or from 
Wilson's organizational dilemma, processes of innovation are likely to be Charged with 
built-in conflicts t . This also holds true for the pattern of management growth 
performed by "isolated" innovations outlined above: without a doubt, they increase 
the efficiency of a specific management sector by fiUing a gap or replacing an obsolete 
item, but at the same time, they possibly reduce the efficiency of other dependent 
sectors and probably of the management system as a whole. They share the same fate 
as highly functional products released from R & 0 labs or assembly lines (like some 
"compunication"· or "C'''-technologies. biotechnology. son energies, the "Concorde" 
etc.), which remain "foreign bodies" because either links to complementary products 
or the favorable institutional (e.g. legislative) climate, or the required infrastructure is 
missing. 
To avoid this negative overall effect, systemic patterns of innovation have been 
adopted, according to which adequate structure is the keyword to management 
progress. One important structural approach is development by differentiation, which 
has (among others) been applied to control' , providing us with feed forward in 
addition to feed back control, on-line control, strategic and operative control, scrutiny 
of assumptions, etc. According to the differentiation-integration-paradigm, adequate 
structures are necessarily integrated structures. The idea of integrated management is 
renected in the plethora of famous acronyms such as MlS, 7-S, OD, MbO, OSS/KS, 
PPBS, ZBB, CIM, 3D, together with contingency approaches (fit, congruency), equity 
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models. equilibria of contributions and inducements. grids. modem controlling. co-
alignment. planned evolution. life-cyde-models of organizations and leadership. elc. 
The advantages or even the necessity of integration seemed evidenl for quite a time. 
They appeared to be based on fundamental "truths" about inlerdependencies like 
Ucontrol without planning is impossible!" and "planning without control is useless!", 
But even these "truths" have been questioned. Some recent investigations disclosed 
that the pattern of inlegration based on complementary relations (harmony) is not Ihe 
long expected panacea. The notorious interface of corporate structure and strategy' 
serves an impressive testimony that simply stating Ihe advantages of integration does 
nOI tell us how to integra le. Moreover. as demonstrated by the "paralysis by analysis-
pitfall" and by two familiar ways of coping with the future. i.e. prediction and 
preparation·, complementary integration according to Uthe morc of the two. the 
better" is not an universally valid approach to management inlegration. There arc two 
simple but nevertheless important lessons to be learned from these deficiencies in 
existing patterns of integration: 
t) Integration must not be loo loose. For personnel management the relation between 
performance appraisal and carreer (developmental) planning serves as a good illustra-
tion of such "integralion gaps". Promolional decisions based upon performance 
appraisal are doomed to failure ("Peter-Principle") unless appraisal data have 
prospective capacity. i.e. emphasize lasting "traits" or trends instead of transitory past 
"states", 
2) Inlegra/ion mus/ no/ be loo /igh/. If planning and control are tighlly inlegrated in a 
controlling system, management will become biased towards incremental interven· 
tions. ]n this case firms will be run by conservative "registrators" utilizing a piecemeal 
controlling system which yields small-step-interventions, incapable of conceding 
heuristics the imponance it deserves. Funhermore. over. integration is detrimental to 
the "integrity" of control as an impartial arbiter within the management system. Loose 
(instead of tight) coupling of management jobs. on the other hand. enhances the 
creative potential of management. A certain level of disintegration. e.g. of in congruency 
and cognitive or normative conflict (as opposed to harmony). improves the explorative 
capacity of management, the evaluative handling of plans and of assumptions. 
ObviOUSly. integrated approaches to management innovation also have to cope with 
nasty difficulties reminiscent of the classical paradoxes and dilemmas of management 
such as Ihe bureaucratic paradox. Ihe control dilemma, or the adminislrative paradox. 
Compared with patterns of isolated innovations. the connict appears just slightly 
modified: tight partial integration is an enrichment which enhances sectoral effiCiency, 
but impairs overall efficiency because integration with other management sectors is 
getting 100 loose. The simultaneous occurrence of fit (increase of integration) and 
misfil (increase ofdisinlegration) gives a slatic formulation of this dilemma o/manage-
ment in/egralion. From a dynamic point of view il says that integrating the manage-
ment system step by step, i.e. integrating two jobs at a time, does not automatically 
facilitale overall integration, but more likely complicates it. Successful "interlocking" 
C'blocking") of complementary or homogeneous management functions often prompts 
phenomena of alienation. segregation. and isolation with respect to the rest of the 
system. 
68 MlR Vol. 27, 198711 
Redefining the Task of Management Integration in Tenns of Optimal Integration 
A prerequisite for avoiding these defects and the only chance to solve the dilemma is 
to refrain from approaches guided by naive "yes-or-no", radical maximum. or short-
sighted sectoral ideas about integrated management. Adequate integration is basically 
a matter of "optimal" integration. Optimality itself is a matter of putting the right 
things together with the appropriate intensity. 
The objective of this paper is to awaken awareness of the dilemma of management 
integration by investigating its nature and impact. It will also try to outline ways of 
handling it in order to obtain optimal integration. For further elucidation of the 
concept. first, the necessities of management integration, Le. the interfaces in the 
management system, must be identified. Subsequently, the idea of optimal manage-
ment integration will be applied to a major innovation in management: diagnosis. 
Optimal integration, i.e. the overall ("holistic") optimum of integration, remains a 
vague idea, as long as it has not been tested against the interfaces in the management 
system. From a fonnal point of view, Le. disregarding the specific interfaces within 
business management like production/marketing or investment/finance, five core 
interfaces of integration can be identified': 
I. Integration of planning and control as the core issue of traditional approaches to 
integration '. 
2. Integration of prospective problem recognition and retrospective control or feed-
forward and feedback-control, a crucial interface for early warning systems, 
proactivc management etc. 7 . 
3. Integration of management activities and information systems, a linkage emphasized 
by MIS and DSS. 
4. Integration of strategic and operative activities within a hierarchital management 
system. 
5. Integration of rationalistic attempts to find optimal solutions for problems and 
realistic attempts to find feasible solutions for systems (employees, customers, plants, 
equipment etc.). The business of integrating "problem"-oriented and "system"-
oriented management activities is usually labelled implementation. 
DiagnOSis seems most suitable for a paradigmatic illustration of the dilemma and its 
handling: 
First, from a denotative point of view, it is an innovation proper: contrary to 
traditional management jobs such as planning and organizing, which tell us what to 
do and how to do it, it describes the job of merely stating that there is something to 
do. The acceptance of such grievance contributions (as opposed to constructive 
suggestions) requires an extended notion of management efficiency, which must also 
reinforce activities of raising dust, and bother or even shock people without having 
something like a plan at hand. In times when overheads are the target of ZBB or 
overhead value analysts, the promotion of such an expansion of overheads appears to 
be quite a heroic venture. 
Secondly, from a connotative point of view, the ambiguity in the evaluation of this 
activity presents a challenge: on the one hand, any manager is afraid of Cassandra 
diagnostics of impending perils. On the other hand, managers are fond of look-out-
diagnostiCS that spot new product-market-bonanzas. 
Thirdly, from a "positioning" point of view, diagnostic thinking has connections to any 
of the integration problems listed above : The idea of diagnostic thinking originates in 
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the integration of feed-forward and feedback control. Ukewise. it takes account of the 
integration of planning and control as well as the management-information systems-
interface. Last but not least. there is concern about its connection with the question of 
implementability. in other words. the borderline between science and science fiction of 
management. 
A Brief Job Description of Diagnosis 
While all of the intervention-oriented management jobs yield problem solutions. the 
ultimate output of diagnostic thinking in management is problems. Problems are 
expressions ofnced for action. The fonnulation of such action-initiating information is 
triggered by the recognition of discrepancies (gaps) between the way things are (more 
correctly: will be) and the way they ought to be. Forecasting such gaps is the realm of 
status-quo-prognostics. as opposed to forecasting action-depending e!Tects in planning. 
Status-quo-forecasts tell us what will happen if no new therapy is applied. Within 
diagnostics. these forecasts are published to initiate aClion. They therefore become 
"reflexive" prognoses of the self-fulfilling type (in case of opponunities) or of Ihe self-
destroying type (in case of threats). Familiar categories of the gaps in question are 
daily difficulties. strategic surprises. exceplional disturbances. pathologies. upsets of 
organizational equilibri3. crises, deviant behavior, disorders, vulnerability, risks, 
threats. conflicts. inability to show reqUisite variety. but also opportunities. unantici-
paled attractiveness. etc. '. A firsl qualitative attempt 10 evaluate the contributions of 
this new management job reveals Ihe following salient advantages (or avoidable disad-
vantages): 
- Diagnosis helps fight the error of the third kind '. 
- Diagnosis avoids troubling planners with unsolvable problems. 
- Diagnosis dissolves pseudo-problems and discloses pseudo-harmonies. 
- Diagnosis discriminates between major and minor problems. 
- Diagnosis prepares for intervention. 
In order to meet these expectations. diagnosis must be composed of manifold ways of 
infonnation processing like exploration, classification, description, prediction, valida-
tion. explanation. and evaluation. Compared with existing concepts of (clinical) 
diagnosis. which operale on the diagnosis-prognosis-dislinction. the "prospective" 
version oullined above is broader and son of pre-integrated. Semantics in this case 
takes account of the fact that for managerial interventions the knowledge about 
present states is merely of instrumental importance, compared with information about 
cenain future states, a lesson primarily learned from life-cycle analysis to. Accordingly. 
familiar operations like testing. analyzing. scrutinizing. auditing. scanning. etc. are only 
inlegraled steps in diagnosis and do not provide diagnostic OUtput information 
themselves. 
The Scope of Integrated Diagnosis 
A first step on the way to the optimal integration of diagnosis is to survey the scope of 
integration pallems by identifying the different kinds of informational bases for 
diagnostic reasoning. 
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Fact 
The tight version of integrated diagnosis attaches the recogllllIon of problems 
exclusively to feedback control . Consequently, need for action is exclusively derived 
from monitoring. i.e. retrospective information (facts) and their extrapolation. Failures 
or strengths registered in the past are considered to be identical with the threats Or 
opportunities expected in the future. Another feature is the tight complementary 
linkage to planning: in planning and conlrol systems, feedback control has Ihe 
monopoly on inducing and reviewing planning activities. In addition, diagnosis is in 
charge of the entire reactive management. i.e. it also conceives adaptive interventions. 
Its unconditional reliance on hard facts makes this variety of diagnosis look sort of 
sombre, bUI at the same time realislic. It keeps management "with bolh feet" in the 
actual world. It obviously corresponds to the theoretical construct of a no-change or at 
least a mechanical ("Newtonion") universe. Unfortunately, however, the practitioner is 
often hardly able to tell which kind of envirorunent his organization is or will be 
coping with. Thus fact·b(i)ased management is udoomed" to miss the requirements of 
the actual situation from time to time. Moreover, the reactions of these "adaptersn are 
likely to show considerable and dangerous time lags. since only strong signals induce 
action. There is no need to add that praactive behavior is prohibited Or appears only 
haphazardously. Apparently, this tight pattern of integration of management suffo-
cates heuristics, which is existential for survival, not only in turbulent or "Einsteinian", 
but also in unstable environments. 
Fantasy 
Within the loose version of integration, diagnosis is considered a managerial function 
of its own, deliberately Slaying aparl from Ihe resl of Ihe clan. It closes a functional 
gap left by the exisling managemenl functions. A first hint at its peculiarity is that il 
works on a kind of prospective information quite different from facts, that mighl be 
(exaggeratedly) called "fantasy". The business of problem recognition is not concerned 
with the aClual world, but deals with possible future worlds captured in scenarios. 
Thus the job of diagnOSiS is delecling possible (novel) threalS and opportunilies by 
"undirected" viewing 11 and forecasting activities as well as what~if.reasoning. By 
relying on fantasy, diagnOSis compensates the built-in inclination of planning and 
feedback control 10 think in terms of stationary or mechanistic systems. It plays the 
role of an antidote or countervailing power against the selective management forces 
addicted to the past. 
Unfonunately, a price has to be paid for such deliberate alienation procedUres. The 
results of planning/control, on the one hand, and diagnosis on Ihe other are no longer 
comparable. It makes little sense to accept an intuitively ("inexactly") derived 
diagnosis as a (counterinductive) test of an empirically ("exactly") tested plan or 
control statement. Incomparability comes to incompatibility, separating the manage-
ment system into two different, but nevertheless interdependent domains where com-
munication is difficult because of the lack of a common language J2 . 
In fact, mosl prolagonists of "compensatory" diagnosis are less radical. They usually 
restrict the range of its applicability to "surveillance" within strategic management 11. 
In this management sector they locate a special need for fantasy: it is not so much the 
specific dealing wilh weak signals or "soft (fuzzy)" facts per se that requires fantasy 
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instead of hard facts. It is rather the handling of disconlinuitits 14, . Empiristic manage· 
ment cannot possibly cope with this phenomenon. since for an empiricist there is no 
way to claim that the future is completely different from the past without questioning 
his own methodological standpoint. 
Both the logical consistency and the plausibility of this argument seem overwhelming. 
Still. the proposed solution of the integration problem is anything but satisfactory. 
Even if the integration of strategic fantasy·based diagnosis and strategic planning can 
be achieved. it "ill be accomplished at the price of another management disintegra· 
tion. This time, the gap is between fantasy.based strategic management. on the one 
hand, and dota-based operative management on the other. The disparity causes not 
only trouble but also communication problems, especially since the latter is hierarchi-
cally dependent on the first. 
Our meta-diagnostic reasoning brings us to the following conclusion: barriers to 
optimal integration arise from the existence of two different infonnational bases of 
management. Why not replace the two adversaries by a third. less troublesome. and 
more integrative basis? 
Experience 
Experience - as opposed to factual knowledge - is basically a system or. more often, 
merely a set of hypotheses. which have undergone some tests. These propositions can 
be pan of indiVidual-subjective or of collective-intersubjective knowledge. In both 
cases they are concerned with comparatively invariant structures. contingencies. causal 
relationships. etc. 
Obviously. this methodological notion of experience corresponds to a "theoretical" 
version of empiricism. It stands out against the atheorelical, SO called dataistic version 
of empiricism analyzed above. where empirical knowledge is the same as factual 
knowledge". However, the implicit premise of a purely factual. unprejudiced, phe-
nomenological, immediate approach to reality is a fallacy. Observational approaches 
to the real world are (theory-) loaded with several varieties of hypothetical knowledge. 
covering observational theories, background and auxiliary theories, etc. 
The production of experiential information is primarily accomplished by utilizing 
logical operations to combine two kinds of input information: first, fantasy which 
enters the production process as conjectures, speculations, explorations (or sometimes 
as already pre-tested hypotheses). Second, facts which enter as observations. sample 
data etc. 
Obviously. the use of experience is not urevolutionary" in that it radically eliminates 
either facts or fantasy from the process of diagnostics. It rather redefines the respective 
contributions of different kinds of information. Informational suppon now comes from 
three sources with experience playing the major role: This re-arrangement was 
inevitable, since 'facts without theory" do not really exist and "fantasy without theory" 
goes along with arbitrary action. The cooperation of the three informational inputs 
works like this: 
- Whereas theory is the immediate informational suppon for diagnostic statements, 
facts and fantasy are the inspirational "cues" that initialize the application of theories. 
As for existing products of fantasy (e.g. scenarios), theory provides the filter 
(touchstone) needed to select (corroborate) conjectures about future threats and 
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opportunities. As for existing facts. theory serves as a vehicle: it decides which data are 
relevant (irrelevant). i.e. which Does should be incorporated (excluded) into (from) the 
diagnostic process. 
- In cases where neither factual nor intuitive information is at hand, theory itself is 
the (deductive) inspirational guide (searchlight. lookout, radar) to discover the relevant 
infonnation needed. Thus theory keeps environmental analysis and internal scruti-
nizing from getting lost due to the lack of a criterion of relevance (e.g. for relevant 
markets) 16 . Managers must be aware of the fact that possibilistic creative scanning 
(viewing) "beyond theory" cannot claim to provide morphological totality because 
neither possible states nor relationships are completely enumerable. 
- Last but not least, theory plays the role of a "third party" when cognitive conflicts 
between factual and conjectural items in diagnostic knowledge arise. By virtue of its 
hybrid character. theory has the integrity to fulfiU this job of a neutral arbiter. First. 
theory is impartial. It has the capacity to be both counter-intuitive. i.e. to question 
beliefs (as demonstrated by the theory of cognitive dissonance). and counter-inductive, 
i.e. to question facts. Secondly. theory is openmined with respect to arguments 
stemming from analytical reasoning or from observation. In other words. factual and 
conjectural information can be applied to improve the quality of hypothetical knowl-
edge. 
In order to manage conflicts between the worlds of facts and fantasy within diagnosis. 
experience must not be conceived as a dogmatic or rigid "Procrustes' bed". An 
orthodox elimination- or paradigm shift-approach would furnish the required flexibility 
of theoretical knowledge by substituting falsified items with new items. It denies the 
built-in flexibility of theories. which enables them to incorporate data and conjectures 
without strict elimination. For one thing. this built-in flexibility is due to the low 
degree of specification of most theories. In addition. flexibility is enhanced by a 
hierarchical structure of theoretical systems according to the Lakatosian model of 
research programs 1" 
Unfortunately. the radical absence of elimination rules may render theoretical 
knowledge a collection of contradictory propositions. Such a pluralistic coexistence 
may be beneficial for exploration, but is unacceptable for final evaluation. Consensus 
either as a cognitive constituent of corporate culture or as the result of consensus, 
devil's advocacy or dialectical techniques must be used to conserve experience like a 
Chinese wall against possibilism. 
All together. built-in flexibility opens theories towards inspirations from the worlds of 
facts and fantasy such as (for diagnostics) new states of relevant variables, new kinds 
of contingencies. modified demarcation between constraints on the one hand and 
instruments on the other. etc. 
Optimal Internal Integration of Diagnostic Systems 
Some problems of the integration of feedback and feed-forward control have been 
implicitly solved above. The affinity of the two varieties of control lies in their 
common concern for discrepancies. They differ in time reference of discrepancies. 
Feedback control usually deals with past weaknesses. failures. and strengths. Within 
first generation early-warning systems, they represent factual inspirational input for 
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diagnosis. In second generation systems. additional input are observations of leading 
indicators. In both cases, the two control processes refer to a common theoretical basis. 
thereby warranting comparability of rcsults. Feedback control uses theoretical knowl-
edge primarily for explanation. diagnosis for both explanation and forecasting. In first 
generation early-warning systems. theory is applied for monitoring purposes. In 
second generation systcms. theory has already been utilized to discover useful 
indicators. 
Optimal internal integration of experience-based diagnosis is primarily dependent 
upon appropriate timing. Fortunately. both jobs care for quick provision of informa-
tion : fced back control primarily for motivation (equity). feed forward control 
primarily for intervention purposes. Problems of comparability may arise from time 
lags between the two activities whenever timing is not perfect. In these cases, the two 
activities are likely to be run on different informational bases (data. models. and 
methods)". 
A more essential difference between the ,,",'0 control processes comes from the fact that 
diagnosis. unlike feedback control. can also be triggered by non-factual information. 
which is typical of third generation early warning systems. Strictly speaking. the 
optimum of integration of the two processes is to determine which proportion of 
inspirational input should come from facts and which from creative pondering about 
possible developments. This explication of "optimally mix~d scanning" is equivalent 
with the well-known methodological problem - unsolved to date - of how to influence 
explorative processes by an optimal mix of inductive and deductive techniques and 
devices (morphology. review. search. expertise. creativity. observation. alertness. etc.). 
Similarly. the integration of operative and strategic diagnosis within a diagnostic 
system can be accomplished by relying on experiencc. Although strategic and 
operative problem recognition differ with respect to their immcdiate impulses (weak 
and strong signals"). they utilize common hypothetical knowledge as a bridging 
dcvice. Quite analogous to the strategy-operation-distinction. differences between the 
two kinds of signals are. fir-a of all. formal in nature: strategic diagnosis is concerned 
with global ("macro"). long-term factors (legislation. technologies. changes in values 
and attitudes. sotio-political risks. etc.). whereas operative diagnosis deals with specific 
("micro"). short-term factors derived from (cost) accounting data. revision of budgets. 
project management. and the like. 
A special characteristic of hierarchically integrated diagnosis is the fact that strong 
signals not only provoke operative diagnostics to detect immediate need for action. 
They are also the starting points of bottom-up-diagnostics. This goes from operative to 
strategic needs for action by persuing the long-term impact of operative discrepancies. 
Vice versa. weak signals may also initiate top-dawn-diagnostics. leading from weak to 
strong signals by decomposing global factors with respect to content and time. 
Optimal integration of operative and strategic diagnosis is not primarily a question of 
how many processes should be inhated from the top or from the bottom. Optimality 
rather implies that impulses do not get lost unless their irrelevance for the other levels 
has been proved. Thus integrated ("synoptic") diagnostic systems cure both managerial 
myopia and managerial hyperopia. 
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Oplimallntegration of Planning and Diagnosis 
From the scanning-planning-paradigm we know that integra ting diagnosis and inter-
vention deals with the dependency of processes o f problem solution on initializing 
processes of problem recognition. From our consideration about integrative informa-
tional bases for management, we know that both jobs utilize experience: diagnosis 
uses it primarily for status-quo-prognostics, planning primarily for "efficiency"-
prognostics. Since not merely integration, but optimal integration is aspired to, this 
interface needs more profound investigation: first, relevant interrelations consist of 
more than just a one-sided initiating connection. Diagnosis already performs prepora-
liollol ac/iv/lies to facililate intervention, either direct response or the construction of 
(flexible) action potentials. Accordingly, the quality of problem recognition predeter-
mines, to some extent, the quality of problem solution. Secondly, models of optimal 
integration are expected to fix optimal allocation of management activities on 
diagnosis. on the one hand, and intervention on the other hand. in other words, 
optimal management budgets. 
Some "neoclassical" reasoning can be used to outline the coordination of diagnostic 
and planning efforts (cp. figure I). Considerations refer to a given interval between a 
horizon of planning, t" and an earliest starting point for planning and diagnostic 
activities. t, . lime represents time "ahead" for prognosis or time "left" for interven-
tion, not time (i.e. resources) "spent": the amounts of resources used for either 
management activity are assumed to be already "optimal" according to the standards 
ofinfonnation economics. 
In the t,-t, interval, costs of problem solution (PS-curve) based upon perfect 
diagnoses are supposed to increase the less time there is left for intervention. 
Opportunity costs of problem recognition (PR-line), on the other hand, decrease, 
because recognition becomes more reliable the closer the events to predict or register . 
are. 
o 
(Opportuni ty- ) 
Costs 
p 
Figure I: 
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Diagnostic activities exert a twofold influence on the shape of total costs (TC-line): on 
the one hand, facilitation of intervention by typology of problems, indication systems, 
etc, reduces planning costs, as the result of substituting planning activities by 
diagnostic activities. On the other hand, diagnosis increases total costs whenever the 
error of the third kind has not been eliminated successfully or pseudo-problems have 
not been unmasked, In these cases costs of over-sensitivity arise, i,e, planning 
departments are employed to solve problems that do not really exist (e,g. for the 
European automobile industries preparing to meet changing announcements of 
legislation concerning speed limits, eatalysator technologies, over time). 
The shape of the TC-curve analytically defines a point IopL of optimal integration in 
terms of opportunity-costs depending on timing (assuming that planning activities are 
triggered without delay). As a matter of fact, budgeting and the determination of (cost 
saving rate based) transfer prices for diagnostic information requires knowledge of the 
exact amounts of the respective costs. Since the model only contains ordinal data. con-
siderations merely serve as a "regulative idea", not as an operational guideline. 
The Implementation of Diagnosis 
The last interface for optimal integration of diagnosis into the management system 
deals with the integration of rationalistic and realistic views of problem recognition in 
management. It may be that experience-based diagnosis is willingly accepted by a 
rationalistic scientific community. But from the realistic standpoint taken by practitio-
ners, it may be viewed as overly rationalized. another contribution to what may be 
more properly termed "science fiction or management". 
Cenainly. statistical evidence on the incidence of early warning systems. environmen-
tal scanning and analysis. as well as case studies in successful proactive management 
makes clear that diagnostical reasoning is an empirical fact. There is also ample 
evidence that a high percentage of firms (big and small business) have elaborate 
feedback control (reporting) systems which serve as a sound basis for factually based 
problem recognition 20. Of course theoretical models on natural and artificial intelli-
gence in problem solving and decision-making contain diagnostic elements. Still. 
acceptance barriers may come from an aversion against the use of theoretical 
experience for diagnostic purposes. 
Fortunately, there is support from theory that theoretical reasoning is no foreign body, 
but rather an indispensable consliluenl wilhin praclical reasoning. This is first true lor 
the individual level, where implicit theories of per.;onality and leadership, patterns of 
attribution. expectations in motivation. superstition etc. have been discovered. It also 
applies to the collective level, where we find theoretical items not only in formal 
information systems, but also in specific corporate cultures (somctimes labeled 
"beliefs", "myths", "basic assumptions" etc.) or in global culture, such as common 
sense, which can be conceived as a set of (sometimes contradictory and poorly 
confirmed) hypotheses, 
Conditions apparently favor the successful implementation of diagnosis: the step from 
factual and implicit theoretical reasoning to explicit application in diagnosis seems 
rather small, Implanting for the scientist is not primarily a task of selling some strange 
academic products, It is rather the job of making homemade theories explicit and of 
teaching their critical handling, e.g, by confronting them with some scientific theories. 
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Future Management Research in Diagnosis 
Our considerations about the adequate handling of the five relevant interfaces in the 
management system gave shape to the concept of optimally integrated diagnosis. A 
corresponding job description "from an integration point of view" covers five 
integration requirements (exhibit 1): 
- Fonnal clarification of infonnation content, i.e. specification and extension of 
problem formulations with respect to quality, amount, time reference, etc. 
Positive validation (verification. confirmation) and normative validation (impact, 
relevance. significance) of factual and conjectural discrepancies against experiential 
knowledge. 
Exhibit 1 .. DiaglJostic activities 
Integration 
Requirement 
Information 
Conlent 
Filter 
Format 
F<X'us 
Structure 
Diagnostic 
Activity 
Specification, 
Completion. 
Operationalisation 
etc. 
Validation 
Evalualion 
Decomposition 
Composition 
Transposition 
Identification 
Coordination 
Cooperation 
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Explication 
Determining adequate 
semantic / pragmatic 
information content 
ofprohJcm formulations 
Finding and testing 
(as well as c:Jiminating pseudo-) 
discrepancies 
Assessing relevance 
of discrepancies 
Splitting complex 
problems into smaller 
problems 
Fusing interrelated 
partial problems to 
aggregate probJem(,) 
Tracing symptomatic dis-
crepancies (global factors) 
to causal discrepancies 
(specific factors) (incl. radical 
substitution of problems) 
Categorizing individual 
problems as elements of 
(intervention-oriented) 
dassification(s) 
Coupling "within" multiple 
diagnostic processes based 
upon (hierarchical) classifi-
cation and lor interrelations 
Coupling "between" 
diagnostic processes and 
other management processes 
Diagnostic Method 
(, eJected) 
(Multidimensional) 
scaling 
Time series analysis. 
ga p-projection, 
scenario-writing. survey-
feed-back. check-lists. 
grievance-systems. early 
warning-systems 
Sensitivity-analysis, 
rating 
Relevance-tree-analysis 
C ross-impact-analysis 
Progressive abstraction. 
path analysis 
Discriminant-analysis, 
experHystems 
Cluster-analysis, factor 
analysis, facet analysis 
Online information and 
communication systems, 
liaison devices 
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- Delerminalion of adequale complexily (size) of problems (as for objeclives. con-
straints. and activities) to match available resources for intervention vis-a-vis the 
(sequenlial. pooled. reciprocal) inlerrelaledness of problems. 
- Indicalion of possible areas of inlervention by analysis of causal f.clors and applica-
tion of intervention..oriented clustering. 
- Inlegralive coupling of inlerrelaled diagnoslic processes and of diagnosis and olher 
manage men I jobs. 
The coneeplu.1 framework of aClivilies in exhibil I decribes Ihe slale of Ihe arl of how 
to overcome the dilemma of integrated management when introducing diagnosis into 
the management system. At the same time. it serves as a meta·diagnostic device to 
reveal what still has to be done in future management research on diagnOSiS. 
A major field of fulure refinemenl of Ihe framework oullined above is Ihe organiza-
tional design of diagnostic management systems. A first concern of organizational 
research is 10 find oul who is besl charged wilh Ihe respeclive dingnoslic jobs. The 
answer 10 Ihis queslion posilively lies beyond Ihe crude slatT-line-dislinction. Ihe 
seleclive reference 10 certain positions or levels of managemenl (CEO. head of SBU. 
conlroller. freeslanding fulllime "look-oul"-specialislS elc.). 11 musl also comprise 
eXlemal partners like consullanlS or various. possibly cooperalively run informalion 
services. Motivational and informational conditions for successful initiation and 
ditTusion of information aboul aClion needs will have 10 be analysed in lerms of 
combined bases of influence (such as informational-, reward-, expert-power etc.). The 
integration of familiar contingency factors like divisional or departmental structures, 
size. Iype of cullure. and environmenl wilh special emphasis on organizalion of 
planning (deparlmenl. lask-force elc.) is obligalory. Taking accounl oflhese conlexlllal 
variables will help one 10 falhom Ihe respeclive ranges of applicabilily for lum-key 
versus lailored diagnoslic syslems. 
Another major concern of organizational design is process coupling within diagnostic 
activities and between diagnostic and non-diagnostic management jobs. A mix of 
continuous and periodical review has to warrant on-line updating of relevant infonna-
lion 10 avoid bOlh loss and obsolelion of informal ion. 
In Ihe course of lime. appropriale organizational design helps eSlablish nol only 
learning intervention systems. but also learning diagnostic systems. Dynamic variations 
of costs of problem recognition can then be incorporated into learning curve models. 
In addilion 10 Ihe inlegralive bridging of pasl and future as well as problems and 
solutions. Ihe design of diagnoslie syslems can be used 10 sludy developmenlal 
processes. in olher words. Ihe dynamic aspeclS of oplimal inlegralion of Ihe manage-
men I syslem. 
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